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Abstract
Restricting a person's substantially voluntary, self-regarding conduct primarily for the sake of that person is
hard paternalism. Particularly in the public health context, scholars, legislators, and judges are devoting
increasing attention to discussing the conditions and circumstances under which hard paternalism is justified.
One popular type of argument for the justifiability of hard paternalism takes its normative warrant from the
consent of the restricted person.
In this Article, I argue that scholars and policymakers should abandon consent-based arguments for the
justifiability of hard paternalism. Such arguments are torn between incoherence and lacking moral force. Very
few consent-based arguments successfully resolve this tension. But even these arguments appeal, at bottom, to
a notion of beneficence for their justificatory force.
Policymakers should not make strained efforts to demonstrate that the subject of hard paternalism has
"consented" to the limitation of liberty. They should, instead, calibrate the moral scales to ascertain the
circumstances under which restricting liberty achieves benefits of sufficient weight to justify overriding
individual liberty. A balancing framework reveals the tradeoffs at issue. And using such a framework will lead
to clearer, more consistent, and more legitimate public policy.
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MONSTROUS IMPERSONATION: A CRITIQUE OF
CONSENT-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HARD
PATERNALISM
Thaddeus Mason Pope*
I. INTRODUCTION
When may the state justifiably restrict our liberty to protect us from
ourselves? May it do so when we voluntarily engage in risky conduct and hurt
no one but ourselves? In other words, when is hard paternalism justified? This
question is becoming increasingly important as hard paternalism is offered as the
rationale for ever-growing numbers of laws and legal decisions.
One popular position holds that hard paternalistic laws are justified only
when those subject to such laws consent to having their liberty restricted. Tom
Beauchamp observes that "an appeal to some kind of consent is central to the
strategy of... prominent theories of justified paternalism."' This position is,
perhaps, to be expected. Consent theory, as Don Herzog observes, "provides
perhaps the single most prevalent paradigm structuring our thinking about law,
society, morality, and politics."
2
But perhaps more importantly, the attractiveness of consent-based
arguments comes from the fact that when a subject consents to having her liberty
restricted for her own good, the paternalistic agent's intervention with the
subject's liberty is "distanced from moral taint" and seems justified. Consent, as
John Kleinig explains, "alters the normative relations in which others stand with
respect to what they may do."
'Assistant Professor of Law, University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center; M.A. (philosophy), Georgetown University; Ph.D.
(philosophy), Georgetown University. Thanks to the participants in a March 2005 faculty
workshop at the Chapman University Law School and to Professors Tom L. Beauchamp, Lawrence
0. Gostin, Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, and Madison Powers for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this Article.
I ToM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 380 (3d
ed. 2001). See also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 418 (2d ed. 1991); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 280 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS]; TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 184 (5"h ed. 2001) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES]. However, it is unclear whether this is still the case.
2 DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 215 (1989).
3 Tziporah Kasachkoff, Paternalism: Does Gratitude Make It Okay? 20 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 5
(1994).
4 John Kleinig, Consent, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 206, 207 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B.
Becker eds. 1992). See also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 53, 176, 177-78, 197 (1986) ("Whatever else consent may do, it transfers at least one part of
the responsibility for one person's act to the shoulders of the consenter," referring to consent as
"granting of permission" or "to grant a privilege") [hereinafter HARM TO SELF]; JOHN KULTGEN,
AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM IN THE CARING LIFE 117 (1995); Thomas J. Lewis,
On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent, 22 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 793, 799 (1989) ("Consenting,
like promising, is a decision to alter a given distribution of rights"); Rosemary Carter, Justifying
Paternalism, 7 CAN. J. PHIL. 133, 134-35 (1977) (arguing that consent, through alienating a subject's
prima facie right to non-interference, "plays the central role in justifying paternalism").
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In other words, if the subject consents to having her liberty restricted, then
restricting her liberty for her own good seems not to violate liberalism's principle
of neutrality by imposing an alien conception of the good on the subject. Instead,
according to the venerable principle volenti non fit injuria: when an agent
intervenes pursuant to the subject's consent, then the agent does not violate the
subject's autonomy.'
Even philosophers and legal theorists taking an absolutist stance regarding
the value of autonomy (relative to other values such as beneficence and justice)
can endorse consent-based hard paternalistic interventions. This is because when
the subject consents to intervention, her presumptive right to noninterference is
not overridden. Rather, it is waived.6
But have patients really consented to having physicians override their
healthcare decisions? Have clients really consented to having their lawyers'
override their legal instructions? Have motorcyclists consented to helmet laws?
Have smokers consented to outdoor smoking bans? Have recreational drug users
consented to the criminalization of marijuana? Have sex workers consented to
the criminalization their chosen profession? Have disabled workers consented to
being fired from their jobs because of their disability?
Hardly.7 While consent-based arguments have a prima facie plausibility, I
will show that they are, in fact, plagued with conceptual and normative
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496B, 496C & 892A (1965); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO
OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 115-17, 215, 220 (1984) [hereinafter HARM TO
OTHERS]; JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 32-33
(1985) [hereinafter OFFENSE TO OTHERS]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
18, at 101 (4th ed. 1971) ("It is a fundamental principle of the common law that volenti non fit
injuria-to one who is willing no harm is done. The attitude of the courts has not, in general, been
one of paternalism"); DONALD VAN DE VEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS
OF BENEVOLENCE 172 (1986) ("The law has long assigned an important role to the presence of
voluntary consent in its determination of the propriety of nontrivial interactions between persons");
Kasachkoff, supra note 3, at 7.
6See JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 55 (1984); KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 115. For this reason,
consent-based arguments are often characterized as taking a "deontological approach" to justifying
hard paternalism. See id. at 145.
7 See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (rejecting worker's challenge to
being fired because of "harm to self"); Hoofnel v. Segal, No. 2004-CA-000412-MR, 2004 WL
911794, *3-4 (Ky. Ct. App.. Apr. 30, 2004) (rejecting battery claim concerning physician's
removal of her ovaries because a "reasonable person" in her position would have consented), cert.
granted, No. 2004-SC-000381 (Ky. Feb. 9, 2005); N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, 315
F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting challenge to smoking ban); The Pros and Cons of Drug
Legalization, Decriminalization and Harm Reduction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Criminal
Justice, Public Policy, and Human Resources of the House Comm. On Government Reform, 106"h
Cong. (July 13, 1999) (testimony of R. Keith Stroup, Esq., Executive Director, NORML) (arguing
for legalization of marijuana); Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 523 (2000); Motorcycle Riders Foundation, Around the USA, MRF REP., July/Aug.
2004, at 8-9 (summarizing efforts in various states to resist helmet laws); Mark Spiegel, The Case
of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 307 (1997). It is, of course, debatable whether this liberty-limiting is properly characterized
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contradictions. Consent fails as a coherent or convincing justification for hard
paternalism.
After more fully defining hard paternalism in Section II, I explore all the
major varieties of consent-based arguments. In Section III, I discuss actual forms
of consent, including "contemporaneous consent," "prior consent," and "tacit
consent." In Section IV I examine conjectural forms of consent, including,
"subsequent consent," "hypothetical rational consent," and "hypothetical
individualized consent." I argue that all these consent arguments are torn
between incoherence and lacking moral force.
In Section V, I argue that very few consent-based arguments for the
justifiability of hard paternalism successfully resolve this tension. But even these
arguments appeal to a notion of beneficence for their justification. But if it is
beneficence that ultimately justifies hard paternalism, then for the sake of
honesty and clarity, that should be transparent. In Section VI, I conclude that
writers should not make strained efforts to demonstrate that the subject of hard
paternalism has "consented" to the limitation of her liberty. They should,
instead, calibrate the moral scales to ascertain the circumstances under which
restricting liberty achieves benefits of sufficient weight to justify overriding
individual liberty. A balancing framework makes explicit the tradeoffs at issue.
And using such a framework will lead to clearer, more consistent, and more
legitimate public policy.
II. DEFINITION OF HARD PATERNALISM
Before proceeding to examine arguments for the justifiability of hard
paternalism, "hard paternalism" must be defined. If we are uncertain about the
definition of hard paternalism, we cannot productively assess arguments for its
justifiability.8 While I have defended a definition of hard paternalism elsewhere,
it is useful to review the key elements of the definition.9
Hard paternalism is the rationale for restricting a subject's liberty under the
following four conditions. The first definitional condition of hard paternalism
requires that the paternalistic agent act intentionally and actually limit the
subject's liberty.'0 As Gerald Dworkin explains, "P acts paternalistically toward
Q if and only if. . .P's act is a limitation of Q's autonomy or liberty."" A
necessary condition of hard paternalism is that the agent intentionally limits the
subject's liberty.'2 Limitation should be construed broadly. It is sufficient that
as hard paternalism. Still, while other rationales (e.g. harm to others, social welfare, allocative
fairness, moralism, efficiency) might be applicable in a certain case, it is important to have the
conceptual and normative structure of hard paternalism developed; so that when and where it is
applicable, we can assess its applicability and defend the conditions for its justifiability.
8 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard
Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 659, 680-81 (2004) [hereinafter Definition].
9
1d.
10 See id at 684-85.
lGerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 564 (Robert Audi
ed., 2d ed. 1995).
1
2Id. at 564.
2005]
UMKC LAW REVIEW
the paternalistic agent intentionally acts as an obstacle to either the subject's
formulation or implementation of substantially voluntary decisions.
The second definitional condition of hard paternalism requires that the
agent's motive for restricting the subject's liberty is subject-focused.'
3
Specifically, the motive must be benevolent toward the subject. As Dworkin
explains, "P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if. . .P acts with the
intent of averting some harm or promoting some benefit for Q.,,14 Van De Veer
similarly explains, "[I]f A acts paternalistically he does so with an altruistic
motive; he aims at promoting the good of another." 15 The paternalistic agent
must limit the subject's liberty with the primary motive either to confer a benefit
upon or to avert harm from the subject.
The third definitional condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent's
motive for intervention be independent from and without regard to the subject's
contemporaneous preferences. Dworkin explains that "P acts paternalistically
toward Q if and only if ... P acts contrary to (or is indifferent to) the current
preferences, desires, or values of Q." 7 Childress explains that the paternalistic
agent acts "on" the subject's behalf but not "at" the subject's behest.
This condition is key. It is not hard paternalism for an agent to limit the
subject's liberty at the subject's request. It was not hard paternalism, for
example, for Odysseus' crew to bind him to the mast.' 9 They were merely
following Odysseus' orders. 20 If the subject wants the agent to intervene and if
the agent intervenes because the subject wants her to intervene, then the agent's
intervention is not paternalistic.2 ' If the agent's intervention is neither contrary to
nor independent from the subject's contemporaneous preferences, then the
agent's intervention is altruism, not paternalism.
The fourth definitional condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent
either disregards whether the subject engages in the restricted conduct
substantially voluntarily, or deliberately limits the subject's substantially
voluntary conduct.22 This condition distinguishes hard paternalism from soft
paternalism.
2 3
13 See Definition, supra note 8, at 694-96.
14 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 564.
1" VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 12.
16 See Definition, supra note 8, at 704-07.
17 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 564.
18 JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 4 n.52 (1982). Cf
Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579,
617 (2004) ("A regulation is no less paternalistic for its happy congruence with the preferences of
the regulated person, who may not even be consulted about the regulation").
19 THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER Book XII, 189 (Harper & Row 1967).
20 id.
21 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 564.
22 See Definition, supra note 8, at 670-72, 708.
23 See id.
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Soft paternalism sanctions intervention only either to protect the subject
from harm to which she did not consent, or to ensure or confirm that the subject
24
really did consent to the harm. Soft paternalism is soft because it does not call
for the constraint of any "real" decisions. 2' Rather, it calls for the constraint of
only impaired decisions, decisions that are the product of compulsion or
misinformation.26 Prescription drug laws, for example, have a soft paternalistic
rationale. No label could be written for such drugs that would enable consumers
to make substantially informed decisions to take them. Expert professional
medical supervision is required to make consumers' decisions substantially
autonomous.27
Hard paternalism, on the other hand, sanctions intervention in spite of the
substantially autonomous nature of an individual's conduct. In contrast to soft
paternalism, hard paternalism does not enable or empower consumers to make
more informed decisions. Instead, hard paternalism is aimed at overriding
consumer's decisions. Hard paternalism doesn't help the consumer make an
informed choice-it eliminates the choice. As suggested by the examples above,
hard paternalism is very controversial.
III. ACTUAL CONSENT ARGUMENTS
A. Objection from Incoherence
Perhaps the paradigm case of consent is contemporaneous consent, where
the subject consents to the agent's restriction of her liberty at the time of
restriction. For example, a physician might ask a patient, "Would you like me to
give you something to make you feel more comfortable?" or "I need to draw
some blood, okay?" If the patient understands and agrees, then the physician will
promptly proceed to act on the patient.
Many writers have attacked the very coherence of consent-based arguments
for the justifiability of hard paternalism. The typical objection asks: How, if the
subject consents to having her liberty restricted, can a restriction of her liberty be
paternalistic? After all, if the subject has consented to the interference so as to
remove the normative problems, then the subject's consent also makes the
24 Some subjects are categorically unable (or presumed to be unable) to consent. For example,
children and the insane are generally considered to be proper subjects of soft paternalism. See
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health against Individual Liberty: The Ethics ofSmoking
Regulations, 61 U. Pirr. L. REv. 409, 454-66 (2000) [hereinafter Balancing].
25 See id. See also Definition, supra note 8, at 667-72.
26 See Balancing, supra note 24. See also Definition, supra note 8, at 667-72.
27 See generally PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE (1980); Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal
Framework for Future Decisions in Transferring Drugs from Prescription to Non-Prescription
Status, 37 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 427 (1982); Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug
Prescriptions, 22 J. L. & ECON. 91 (1979).
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agent's interference something other than a limitation of autonomy or
paternalism.
28
This objection makes good sense. A definitional condition of hard
paternalism requires that an agent's restriction of a subject's liberty be
independent from the subject's preferences. 29 If the subject consents to having
her liberty restricted, then, the objection goes, the agent's restriction of the
subject's liberty is no longer independent from, but is, instead, dependent upon
(i.e. pursuant to) the subject's preferences. Thus, the consent-based argument for
paternalism seems to beg the question of whether hard paternalism is justifiable.
The Objection from Incoherence can be reduced to the following syllogism:
I. Hard paternalism requires (as a logically necessary condition) that
the agent act independently from the subject's preferences.
2. If the agent acts pursuant to the subject's consent, then the agent is
not acting independently from the subject's preferences.
3. Therefore, if the agent acts pursuant to the subject's consent, the
agent is not acting paternalistically.
If the subject consents, then the agent's liberty limitation simply cannot be
paternalism. The subject's consent might make the limitation justifiable.
However, it doesn't answer the question of whether hard paternalistic restriction
is justifiable, because consented-to restriction would not be hard paternalistic.
B. Response to the Objection from Incoherence
Escape from the Objection from Incoherence is difficult. The proponent of
consent-based arguments is confronted with a choice between two mutually
exclusive alternatives. She is faced with a dilemma between drawing upon the
justificatory force of the subject's consent, on the one hand, and having the
subject's consent redefine the intervention as non-paternalism, on the other hand.
While it is possible, with additional conceptual precision, to retain the
paternalistic nature of the liberty restriction; this can be done only through
simultaneously losing the requisite justificatory force of the subject's consent.
29 See CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 156 n.52 (1982); KULTOEN, supra note 4, at 116; Tom L.
Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, Voluntariness and Comprehension, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
SOCIAL POLICY 123, 132 (John Howie ed. 1983) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism];
James Woodward, Paternalism and Justification, in NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICs AND PUBLIC POLICY
(Kai Nelson & Steven C. Patten eds.), published as 8 CAN. J. PHIL. 67, 70 n.4 (Supp. 1982); David
Archard, Self-Justifying Paternalism, 27 J. VALUE INQUIRY 341, 342 (1993); Douglas M. Husak,
Paternalism and Autonomy, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 27, 30-31 (1981); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency
of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 244 n.4 (1998); Kurt Melvin Armsden, Paternalism: Its Scope
and Limits 94-97, 111 (1989) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with author).
29 See supra, notes 16 to 18, and accompanying text. Furthermore, paternalism and consent have
historically been presented as opposite and inconsistent notions. See, e.g., Thor v. Sup. Ct., 855
P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); STEPHEN WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN
BENEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTHCARE 29-48 (2d ed. 1998).
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Take, for example, the standard form of the Objection from Incoherence, the case
where the agent acts pursuant to the subject's consent. The force of the objection
comes in the assumption that when the subject consents, the agent restricts her
liberty because she consented. In other words, the Objection from Incoherence
assumes that the subject's consent is the motivation for the agent's intervention.
However, this is not the only possible connection between a subject's
consent and an agent's intervention. We can distinguish between (1) consent as
authorization and (2) consent as the motivation or basis for an agent's restriction
of a subject's liberty. The subject may give her consent, but it need not serve as
the agent's motive for intervening.30 The agent can act consistent with, but not
pursuant to, the subject's preferences. In other words, the agent might restrict
the subject's liberty. The subject might even consent to that restriction. But
there need not be any causal connection between the two events.
The paternalistic agent and the subject may agree that the agent should
intervene, but to be paternalistic, the agent and subject cannot agree on why the
agent should intervene. The agent's decision to limit the subject's liberty must
be independent from the subject's consent such that it is "motivationally
impotent." The subject might think the agent should intervene because that is
what she, the subject, wants. However, the paternalistic agent does not care that
the subject wants him to intervene; it is not a relevant consideration. The
paternalistic agent intervenes for his own, albeit benevolent, independent reasons.
The paternalistic agent intervenes because he thinks that he knows better than the
subject how the subject ought to behave.
In other words, the subject's consent does not necessarily make the agent's
liberty limitation non-paternalistic. The subject's consent makes the agent's
intervention non-paternalistic only if the subject's consent is the primary factor
motivating the agent to intervene. If the agent was going to intervene anyway-
regardless of the subject's consent-then the fact that the agent and subject
merely happen to agree that the agent should intervene does not make the agent's
intervention non-paternalistic.
If the subject consents and the agent does not know, or care about, the
consent, then the agent's motive is still paternalistic. For example, the subject
might have left a written note on her refrigerator, authorizing the agent to restrict
her liberty in manner M under circumstance C. But on the occurrence of
circumstance C, the paternalistic agent restricts the subject's liberty in manner M
without ever having seen or read the subject's note. Under such circumstances,
the subject's consent does not change the proper definition of the agent's liberty
limitation as paternalistic.
30 See Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP: VOLUME THREE: APPENDICES STUDIES ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 63, 71 (1982) [hereinafter Dworkin, Autonomy and
Informed Consent].
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However, while the subject's consent under these circumstances does not
change the paternalistic nature of an agent's intervention, neither does it add
anything to the justification of the agent's intervention. The subject's consent
might have some evidentiary value. But it cannot affect the justifiability of the
agent's hard paternalistic intervention because it is causally unconnected to the
intervention. The consent was not the reason or basis for the agent's
intervention. Instead, it is just a contingent fact describing the intervention and
the agent-subject relationship.
In sum, formulating a coherent contemporaneous consent-based
justification for hard paternalism seems impossible. There seems to be a
dilemma. On the one hand, if the subject's consent justifies the intervention, then
the intervention cannot be hard paternalism. On the other hand, if the subject's
consent is such that it does not change the hard paternalistic nature of the
intervention, then the consent cannot have any justificatory force.
Proponents of consent-based justifications for paternalism must walk a
tightrope. On the one hand, they must be careful not to allow the force of the
subject's consent to make the agent's interference non-paternalistic. And, on the
other hand, they must be careful to allow the consent to have enough force to
produce sufficient justificatory weight. This tension pulls on consent-based
arguments for hard paternalism.
C. Prior Consent
Donald Van De Veer has offered an innovative response to the Objection.3'
Van De Veer's strategy is to separate (1) the subject's consent to the agent's
interference from (2) the subject's preferences expressed at the time of the
agent's interference.3 In other words, Van DeVeer relies on the subject's prior
consent instead of her contemporaneous actual consent.3
Van De Veer makes two arguments which jointly comprise what he calls
the "Principle of Autonomy-Respecting Paternalism" ("PARP"). 3 4 PARP holds
that an agent A may justifiably interfere X with a subject S where:
(1) S has given currently operative valid consent to A to do X
OR
(2) S would validly consent to A's doing X if:
(a) S were aware of the relevant circumstances
AND
(b) S's normal capacities for deliberation and choice were not impaired
31 See generally, VAN DE VEER, supra note 5.
32
Id. at6.
13 See id. at 45-94.
34 Id. at 45-94, 128-29.
[Vol. 73:3
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Van De Veer names the first condition (1) the "Restricted Consent
Principle" ("RCP").3 5 Van De Veer names the second condition (2) the
"Principle of Hypothetical Individualized Consent".36 Van De Veer concedes to
the Objection from Incoherence that with a subject's contemporaneous consent,
an agent's intervention cannot be paternalistic. 3 But Van De Veer contends the
Objection lacks force under some circumstances of consent.38
In his Restricted Consent Principle, Van De Veer temporally separates (1)
the subject's prior consent to intervention from (2) the agent's subsequent
interference with the subject's liberty.39 Therefore, the agent can intervene
pursuant to the subject's consent (given at T1), yet can still do so (satisfying the
definitional condition of hard paternalism) independent from or even contrary to
the subject's current preferences (expressed at T2-i.e. those preferences
contemporaneous with the intervention). 0
Van De Veer's RCP proposal is examined in terms of the simplified logical
form of the Objection from Incoherence:
1. Hard paternalism requires that the agent act independently from the
subject's preferences.
2. If the agent acts pursuant to the subject's consent, then the agent is
not acting independently from the subject's preferences.
3. Therefore, if the agent acts pursuant to the subject's consent, the
agent is not acting paternalistically.
41
Van De Veer distinguishes the subject's preferences in premise (1) from the
subject's consent in premise (2).42 Since each of these preferences or
"expressions" of the subject has an independent evidentiary basis, premise (2) is
false. In other words, the agent might act with the subject's (prior) consent yet
still do so contrary to her (present) preferences. Therefore, argues Van De Veer,
although consent-based, the agent's restriction of the subject's liberty can still be
patemalistic.
43
Moreover, argues Van De Veer, the paternalistic agent's intervention is
justified because the subject's prior consent is still "currently operative" 44 so that
35 Id. at 51-58.
36 VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 75-81.
37 See id. at 64.
38 rd.
" Id. at 51-58.
40 See id.
41 See VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 51-58.
42 id.
41 Id. at 51-58.
44Id. at 51, 57; see also HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 181-82 ("Proof that it was once validly
granted... is a demonstration of actual consent still functioning"); Armsden, supra note 28, at 83-
93; Valdar Parve, Value-Neutral Paternalism, 219 BOSTON STUD. PHIL. ScI. [ESTONIAN STUD. HIST.
& PHIL. Sci.] 271, 280 (2001) ("Certainly an act committed in accordance with the recipient's self-
binding consent, but contradictory to the recipient's current consent, is paternalism").
2005]
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the intervention is "sanctioned interference. ''45 In sum, Van De Veer shows that
consent can justify hard paternalism without redefining it as non-paternalism.
46
He does this by distinguishing between contemporaneous actual consent and
prior actual consent.47
It is important to note that Van De Veer's RCP allows not just any prior
consent but only "currently operative" prior consent to justify paternalism.
48
This is an important distinction. Prior consent has the moral purchase of
concurrent actual consent only when it is specific to the circumstances. 49 For
example, Odysseus' consent to being bound to the mast retained its justificatory
force even in the face of Odysseus' later contrary choices only because, having
been advised by the Goddess Circe, he understood and carefully specified the
circumstances under which he wanted to be restrained.5
Another example of circumstance-specific prior consent is where
individuals ask their family or friends to take their car keys at a party should they
drink too much.5 ' Here, the subject's prior consent clearly anticipates the precise
circumstances under which the agent might later interfere-presumably contrary
to the subject's later (drunken) preferences.
5 2
In contrast, should the subject consent to only a general type of treatment,
her consent cannot have the same value. Beverly Woodward explains that "on a
consent-based theory there must be (actual, expected, or hypothetical) consent to
the specific kind of interference contemplated and not just a general recognition
on the part of the subject of the desirability of the good which the interference is
designed to protect." To be "currently operative," the subject's prior consent
must be specific to the later circumstances (under which the agent intervenes).
45VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 65, 203, 204-13, 301 n.73, 424. See also NINA NIKKU,
INFORMATIVE PATERNALISM: STUDIES IN THE ETHICS OF PROMOTING AND PREDICTING HEALTH 69, 92
n.30 (1997); Sin Yee Chan, Paternalistic Wife? Paternalistic Stranger? 26 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
85, 90 n.16 (2000).
46 VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 49-58.
47 ld.
4 Id. at 51.
49 See KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 138; Bailey H. Kuklin, Self Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U.
CN. L. REV. 649, 656-57 nn.10-16 (1992).
50 See VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 294-301. Of course, Odysseus' subsequent conduct was
almost certainly not substantially voluntary. He was, after all, under the admittedly coercive
influence of the siren songs. Id. at 295. Therefore, Odysseus' crew would have been justified in
keeping him bound to the mast for soft paternalistic reasons. See id. But even were the soft
paternalism liberty limiting principle not applicable, on Van De Veer's theory, Odysseus' prior
consent would have legitimized his crew's hard paternalistic intervention.
51 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 4, at 134-36.
52 See id. Another example is where an injured patient recognizes that without physical therapy she
will never walk again. In light of this, she concludes that walking is more important than avoiding
pain and asks to be "forced" to undergo therapy, even against her inevitable protestations. See John
K. Davis, Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 267,
276 (2004).
53 Woodward, supra note 28, at 73. See also John Harris & Kirsty Keywood, Ignorance,
Information and Autonomy, 22 THEORETICAL MED. 415, 421 (2001) ("Ignorance of crucial
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The problem is that empirical research shows that people have great
difficulty anticipating later circumstances with sufficient specificityf54  While
prior consent (sometimes referred to as self-paternalism) may be coherent,55 it
has limited applicability.
56
For example, while motorcyclists might vote for the democratic
representatives who later enact public health regulations, they never gave any
specific consent to, for example, a helmet restriction. 57 In these circumstances,
the motorcyclist's prior consent is not "currently operative," and lacks
justificatory force.5 The same vagueness plagues the prior-consent argument for
most other cases of hard paternalism. Currently operative prior consent is a valid
means of using a subject's consent to justify hard paternalistic intervention.
However, it is, as a practical matter, rarely applicable.
D. Tacit Consent
Local conventions establish all sorts of unstated conduct as providing valid
consent. This sort of consent, either expressed by omissions or inferred from
actions, is typically referred to as "tacit consent., 59 Professor Craig Carr explains
information is inimical to autonomy.., where the individual is ignorant of information that bears
upon rational life choices she is not in a position to be self-governing"); Barbara Pinto, Automatic
Consent, ABC NEWS, June 1, 2004 (reporting criticism of the R-card on the grounds that parents
would not know what films their kids would be watching while not chaperoned). But cf George
W. Rainbolt, Prescription Drug Laws: Justified Hard Paternalism, 3 BioETHiCS 45, 50-51 (1989)
(arguing that metaknowledge, knowledge of the extent of one's knowledge of specific facts, though
not the specific facts themselves, is sufficient for consent).
54 See, e.g., Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
HASTINGS CTR REP., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 30.
55 See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 186.
56 See id. at 82. Most typical cases of prior consent are cases where the paternalistic intervention is
already justified as soft, not hard, paternalism. Indeed, this may even be necessary because,
otherwise, it would be unclear why an earlier substantially voluntary choice should trump a later
substantially voluntary choice. Cf Mikko Weinberg, Modeling Hypothetical Consent, 17 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 16, 22-24 (2003). One answer is that the earlier choice also includes a
"resolution preference" concerning how to resolve the conflict. See Davis, supra note 52, at 274.
But even the more cogent articulations of this position "are limited to where the agent's
competence declines ... substantially over time." Id. at 275. "[P]recedent autonomy occurs only
when the agent is earlier able to comprehend a choice he cannot later comprehend." Id. at 289.
57 See, e.g., Abate of Georgia v. State, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (dismissing case
challenging constitutionality of helmet law); Balancing, supra note 24, at 435-37 (collecting legal
challenges to helmet laws); A. Barton Hinlde, Bare-Headed Pursuit of Happiness Should Be
Rider's Choice, RicHMoND-TmIEs DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2001, at Al 1.
58 VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 251. See also Balancing, supra note 24. Obviously, the use of
consent in the democratic and legislative context is more complicated than in the one-on-one
context. Alas, a systematic analysis of the differences is beyond the scope of this article.
59 See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 183-84. Beauchamp and Childress employ the term
"tacit consent" to refer to only the case where an inference is made from the subject's (passive)
omission. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 128. Childress uses the separate term "implicit
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that "[i]ndividual actions or general action plans will signal consent when they
are embedded in a social context that identifies them as actions associated with
participation in some rule-governed activity or association.,
60
At an auction, for example, just by raising one's hand during the bidding
one consents to purchase the auctioned item at the price of the current bid. In
other situations, a nod of the head will signal consent. In still other situations, the
signal of consent might come from more involved participation. For example,
were someone to play the first three innings in a softball game, we would
understand that person to have consented to play the whole game, and to do so
according to the rules.6 1
If tacit consent can substitute for actual explicit contemporaneous consent,
then there seems to be no reason why tacit consent cannot act as a full substitute
for any other form of consent.62 Therefore, as long as the evidentiary basis for
inferring consent is sufficiently well-grounded in social conventions, a subject's
consent can be tacit. Tacit consent is like an American Express Traveler's
Cheque: it's as good as cash, or as good as the real thing. Nevertheless, tacit
consent refers only to the vehicle of expression and not to the "content" of
consent. While a subject's consent may be expressed tacitly, that does not reach
the more difficult normative question: What sort of consent (however it is
expressed) can justify hard paternalistic liberty limitation? Consequently, the
normative value of a subject's tacit consent will depend on the sort of actual
consent (e.g. actual contemporaneous, prior) that it represents.
IV. CONJECTURAL CONSENT ARGUMENTS
So far I have examined three forms of actual consent: contemporaneous
consent; prior consent; and tacit consent. I concluded that only prior explicit
consent and, by extension, prior tacit consent, can justify hard paternalistic
intervention-and even then, in only very limited circumstances. Now, I examine
conjectural forms of consent.
Legal and philosophical writers have found conjectural consent arguments
strained and unconvincing.63 They can, as Bailey Kuklin, observes, "run
consent" to refer to the case where an inference is made from the subject's (active) action. See also
CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 80-82.
60 Craig L. Carr, Tacit Consent, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. 335, 337 (1990).
61 See Daniel Brudney. Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 LAW & PHIL. 235, 263-64
(1991); Carr, supra note 60, at 338 (using the examples of chess and tennis); id. at 342 ("We
presume in large measure that an ordinary person living an ordinary life will come to grasp the
social meaning of a great many of the participatory acts and action plans present in his or her
society").
62 See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, 183-84, 186; NiKKu, supra note 45, at 107-09, 111; VAN DE
VEER, supra note 5, at 173; A. John Simmons, Consent, in 2 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 596, 597 (Edward Craig ed. 1998); Chan, supra note 45, at 91, 91 n.18 ("Tacit consent
justifies as well as explicit consent does"); Cynthia Stark, Hypothetical Consent and Justification,
97 J. PHIL. 313, 315 (2000) ("Tacit consent is a kind of actual consent").
63 KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 66, 132.
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amuck., 64 Beauchamp and Childress explain that "fictions of consent . . . are
misleading and dangerous., 65 "A justification based on consent may do more to
obscure than to clarify the issues. 66  And John Kleinig echoes this concern,
charging consent-based arguments with "ad hocery. ' 67 Kleinig writes that "some
of the consent-based arguments for paternalism make nonsense of consent."
68
Notwithstanding these criticisms, conjectural consent arguments pervade
the legal, philosophical, and bioethical literature, and they supply the decisional
framework employed by legislatures and courts.69 These conjectural consent
arguments include: (1) subsequent consent; (2) hypothetical rational consent;
and (3) modified hypothetical consent. While these conjectural consent
arguments are not subject to the Objection from Incoherence like the actual
consent arguments,70 they do strain for sufficient moral warrant.
A. Subsequent Consent
Subsequent consent is what the subject gives when she signifies
authorization for an agent's interference after the interference has already
occurred.71 What makes subsequent consent problematic is that consentt requires
more than acquiescence. 72 A subject may agree the outcome of her choice is
64 Kuklin, supra note 49, at 660 n.23.
65 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 129.
66 Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1914, 1916 (Warren T. Reich,
ed. 1996).
67 KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 62.
68 Id. at 132, 59 (arguing that consent "figures as a normative explanation for what are believed to
be justifiable impositions"). See also HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 5, at 90 (disowning backward
causation); HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 182-83; HETA HAYRY, THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
PATERNALISM 118-19(1991); KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 61-63; KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 119, 120-
21, 123, 139, 224 (arguing that consent arguments "could be extended to almost any intervention
by the enthusiastic paternalist" and that they go down the "road of implausibility"); NIKKU, supra
note 45, at 81-88, 110; VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 66-70; Archard, supra note 28, at 342;
Carter, supra note 4; Chan, supra note 45, at 90-92; John D. Hodson, The Principle of Paternalism,
14 AM. PHIL. Q. 61, 63 (1977); Husak, supra note 28, at 33; Kasachkoff, supra note 3, at 6-20;
Rainboldt, supra note 53, at 57 ("This view has little plausibility"); Alan G. Soble, Paternalism,
Liberal Theory, and Suicide, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 335, 351 (1982); Stark, supra note 62, at 321 ("Only
actual consent sanctions coercion"); Albert Weale, Paternalism and Social Policy, 7 J. Soc. POL'Y
157, 171-72 (1978); Woodward, supra note 28, at 70-71 n.5; Armsden, supra note 28, at 81, 114-
48.
69 One conjectural consent argument was recently explicitly incorporated into Israel's Patient's
Rights Law of 1996. Israel Patient's Rights Law, ch.4 § 15(2)(c) (1996). The IPRL requires
"retroactive consent" as one of three conditions that must be satisfied before a patient can be
forcibly treated." For other examples, see infra, notes 71-164, and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
71 See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 173.
72 See id; KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 56-58; KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 138; NIKKu, supra note 45, at
81-88, 110.
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undesirable and yet refuse to consent to interference. 73 "' [C]onsent' in the sense
of mere psychological willingness or passive acquiescence is not authorization; it
does not transfer responsibility for A's act jointly to B."74
Take the case of Donald "Dax" Cowart. Dax was terribly burned in a
propane gas explosion.75 For the next fourteen months, Dax endured very painful
burn treatments.76 During those fourteen months, Dax repeatedly demanded that
he be allowed to die.77 Yet, despite his deliberate decision to die, treatment was
forced upon him against his own wishes and for his own good.78 The doctors
explained, "[w]e don't believe you really want to die.... It's just your pain and
depression talking. One day you'll thank us for this. 79
Dax Cowart ultimately acquiesced in the "new" life that his doctors
provided for him.80 He later married, earned his law degree, and is glad to be
alive.8' Nevertheless, Dax has made it clear that: "If at this moment, I found
myself in the same or similar circumstances ...my decision would be the
same. In every interview that he has given, Dax is very clear that he does not
find justified what the doctors did. 3 Nor does he forgive their paternalistic
intervention.
84
20/20: Do you believe the doctors made the right decision to treat you,
knowing now what you've been able to do, the person you've been able to
become?
73 HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 173.
74 id.
75 Lonnie D. Kliever, Preface to DAX's CASE: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND HuMAN MEANING,
at xi, xi (Lonnie D. Kliever ed. 1989).
76 Id.
71 Id. Contrast this with the consent to treatment that was famously found to be implied in Cotnam
v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907). In that case, the patient was unconscious and expressed no
preferences, much less substantially voluntary preferences against treatment.
78 Id.
79 Alice Steinbach, Please Let Me Die: Dax's Story, BALT. SuN, Apr. 26, 1998, at 10E.
Notwithstanding the doctors' implications that Dax was incompetent, it appears that Dax's
demands to die were substantially autonomous. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE 1112-17 (1984) (transcript of videotaped interview of Dax conducted by Robert B.
White, M.D., at the time of treatment).
So See generally AREEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 1117 n. 1; KLIEVER, supra note 75, at xi; Tonya
Eippert, A Proposal to Recognize a Legal Obligation on Physicians to Provide Adequate
Medication to Alleviate Pain, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 381, 398 (1998).
81 Eippert, supra note 80, at 398.
82 Pamela Spencer, Patient Rights Advocate Speaks at Michigan State U., U-WIRE, Oct. 18, 1999.
83 See, e.g., AREEN, supra note 79, at 1112-17.
8 See, e.g., id; James F. Childress & Courtney C. Campbell, "Who Is a Doctor to Decide Whether a
Person Lives or Dies?" Reflections on Dax's Case, in DAx's CASE: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN MEANING 23-41 (Lonnie D. Kliever, ed. 1989); Christine Wicker, Sentenced to Life-
Dax Cowart Crusader for Right to Die, Hous. CHRON., May 21, 1989, at 9.
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Dax: No, they made the wrong decision.... I think their heart was pure, but
they were wrong.8 5
Baltimore Sun: Do you still wish you'd been allowed to die?
Dax: The best I can answer is that I'm glad to be alive. I've had some happy
experiences I wouldn't have had if I had died. But I still believe I should
have been the one to make that choice at that time. And my choice was to
refuse treatment. If the same thing were to happen today-even knowing that
I could reach this point-I would still make the same choice.
8 6
But even if Dax had given his subsequent approval-"Thank you, doctor.
You were right and I'm glad you made me endure those burn treatments"-and
in such a way that it was substantially voluntary,87 would that justify the
paternalistic intervention? Or, instead, would it simply make the doctors less
blameworthy?
The consensus is that subsequent consent can only affect the agent's
culpability and never his responsibility. 88 Feinberg explains, "B's forgiveness
cannot change history or magically recreate the past. Her forgiveness now has a
point only because there is something to forgive. 89 In other words, the agent did
not act with the subject's consent at the time he intervened.90  The subject's
subsequent approval, even if forthcoming, is not equivalent to subsequent
consent.91
Subsequent consent, in short, "come[s] too late to be morally operative at
the time the decision to intervene must be made. If it does come at a later time, it
8' ABC News 20/20, A Man of Endurance, (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 22, 1999) available at
1999 WL 6790606.
86 Alice Steinbach, Dax's Story: This Office Needed Dax. The Office Was Drifting, and He Has
Brought Us Together, BALT. SUN., Apr. 29, 1998, at 1E (quoting Dax's reponse to a student's
question at a question and answer forum at Texas A & M University).
87 See RONALD M. DwoRKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACICE OF EQUALITY 218,
269 (2000); Carter, supra note 4, at 139-42 (listing conditions that would vitiate the voluntariness
of subsequent consent). John K. Davis suggests that subsequent consent cannot justify hard
paternalism because it is "limited to cases where the consenting party enjoyed a substantial increase
in mental competence after the interference and before giving subsequent consent." Davis, supra
note 53, at 283. See also id at 288 ("Cases of genuine subsequent consent require a significant
increase in competence over time, are are therefore probably rare, perhaps confined to occasional
situations involving very young children or adults suffering serious but temporary mental
impairment").
88 See generally ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977); Donald H. Regan,
Paternalism, Freedom, Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM 113, 137-38 n.17 (Rolf
Sartorius ed. 1983) ("[R]etrospective consent is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the justifiability of paternalistic intervention").
89 HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 182.
90 KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 63.
91 Id.
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cannot have the effect of retroactively warranting the prior intervention." 92 John
Kleinig explains: "If any rights were violated, they were violated, not when
consent was not subsequently given, but when the person was initially interfered
with. The so-called subsequent consent does not alter that, for it is not, in any
nonpersuasive sense, a form of consent."
93
Subsequent consent is interesting because the subject gives (or purports to
give) express or tacit consent to the agent's intervention. Still, subsequent
consent is not a form of actual consent because, coming after the intervention, it
cannot alter the normative status of that intervention. 94 There must be a causal
connection between the subject's consent and the agent's intervention. And,
given the sequence of events, that causal connection is lacking where the subject
gives subsequent consent.
For example, suppose a physician, in a non-emergency situation, seized,
sedated, and operated on a patient, thereby successfully curing a condition for
which the patient had not sought treatment. The patient's subsequent consent to
the intervention, upon her being later informed of her medical condition and the
reason for the operation, would not justify the earlier intervention.95 Indeed, Sin
Yee Chan argues that not only does subsequent consent fail to justify
paternalistic intervention, but it does just the opposite: it "underscores the
wrongness of the act forgiven. 96  The patient's consent emphasizes that her
92 HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 187.
93 KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 63.
94 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 156 ("[Rletroactive approval is not a substitute for informed
consent or refusal"); CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 93 ("Because the intervention has already
occurred (or at least begun), it may be misleading to describe the patient's subsequent approval as
'consent,' as though it creates rights in the same way as past or present consent"); HARM TO SELF,
supra note 4, at 182 ("There is very little that can be done, despite the ingenious efforts of some
philosophers, to extract coherence from the strange notion of 'subsequent consent"'); OFFENSE TO
OTHERS, supra note 5, at 90 (disowning backward causation); Peter Gardner, Paternalism and
Consent in Education, 17 J. PHIL. & EDuC. 57, 62 (1983) ("Talk of subsequent consent is somewhat
odd because consenting, like giving permission and granting, is concerned with the present or
future"); David Gordon, Comment on Hospers, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 267, 272 (1980)
(thankfulness and even a change of mind is not consent); Donald Van De Veer, Paternalism and
Subsequent Consent, 9 CAN. J. PHIL. 631, 638 (1979) (calling subsequent consent a "philosophical
fiction").
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965).
A has a wart on his neck. His physician, B, advises him to submit to an operation for
its removal. A refuses to do so. Later A consents to another operation, and for that
purpose is anesthetized. B removes the wart. The removal in no way affects A's
health, and is in fact beneficial. A has suffered bodily harm.
Id. This is consistent not only with tort law but also with criminal law. A victim's subsequent
consent is ordinarily not a defense to a criminal prosecution unless consent is an element of the
offense. See generally CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 46 (15th ed. 1993);
BERNARD WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENSES § 87 (3d ed. 2000).
96 Chan, supra note 45, at 88.
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autonomy (as a right) was violated and serves only as evidence of whether the
intervention was justified. 97
In sum, if subsequent consent is to have any justificatory force, it must
come from the force that such consent might have only at the time of the
intervention. James Childress makes this point by arguing that the subject might
die before having the opportunity to signify her consent. The subject's death
under such circumstances would produce the odd result that the intervention
would be unjustified as a result of an arbitrary event.98 The defender of
subsequent consent is forced to respond that what is really required is not the
subject's subsequent actual subsequent consent but her anticipated consent.
99
Thereby, subsequent consent reveals itself to be, at bottom, a form of
hypothetical consent argument. So, we turn now to examine that argument.' °
97 See JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS 130 (1997) [hereinafter
CHILDRESS, PRAcTicAL REASONING] ("An appeal to future ratification is insufficient to justify
paternalistic interventions, and it is also unnecessary to justify such actions"); id. at 63-64
("[A]ctual or predicted future consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify interventions
against current choices. At most a patient's probable future consent may provide evidence that the
criteria for justified paternalistic interventions have been met") (emphasis added); KULTGEN, supra
note 4, at 121 (arguing that subsequent approval "has a certain epistemological value for the agent"
but that this "does not add to the justification of the action") (emphasis added); Shimon M. Glick,
The Morality of Coercion, 26 J. MED. ETHics 393, 393 (2000); Wennberg, supra note 56, at 21.
98 See, e.g., CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 96.
" See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 182 ("Most of the work assigned to this concept can be
handled adequately by the notion of dispositional consent.... The 'subsequent consent theory' ...
holds that when we intervene we are 'betting' our moral capital on the other's subsequent
consent."); Davis, supra note 53, at 271-72 ("The preference expressed in subsequent consent
arrives too late; at best, one can act on anticipated subsequent consent"); id. at 286 ("[I]t makes
more sense to speak of being authorized by anticipated subsequent consent"); Shimon M. Glick,
Unlimited Human Autonomy-A Cultural Bias? 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 954-56 (1997). One more
recent defender of subsequent consent concedes: "it's your present expectation of future consent
that matters, not the actual future consent." Eric Lee-Kuo Chwang, The Duty Against Paternalism
222 (unpublished dissertation 2003). Chwang further concedes that "the most reasonable
expectation about subsequent consent won't be high enough to reach whatever threshold you think
is sufficient to justify your action." Id. at 221.
100 Philosophers offer anticipated and dispositional consent as distinct forms of consent that can
justify paternalistic intervention. Compare KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 59-61; KULTGEN, supra note
4, at 139, 202; NIKKu, supra note 45, at 106-07; Armsden, supra note 28, at 123; Husak, supra note
28, at 34, with GERALD DwORKItN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 87-90 (1988)
[hereinafter DWORKN, AUTONOMY]; ALAN GEwIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 259 (1978);
KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 122; Michael D. Bayles, Book Review, 7 L. & PHIL. 107, 114 (1988)
(reviewing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1986));
Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 77-78. But these arguments are not
substantially distinguishable from either hypothetical rational consent or hypothetical
individualized consent arguments. If the agent anticipates the subject's consent or supposes that
the subject was disposed to consent, it must be, on the one hand, because the agent knows (or
thinks he knows) the subject's settled preferences on this matter. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4,
at 173 ("Dispositional consent then is not actual consent, and can only be presumed, not known");
id. at 174 (in dispositional consent there is no opportunity to obtain consent and circumstances
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B. Hypothetical Rational Consent
Some philosophers and legal theorists employ the notion "hypothetical
rational consent" to justify interventions for a person's own good when actual
consent is not forthcoming.'" Actual consent is not forthcoming because, at the
time of intervention, the individual prefers that there be no intervention. Her
"hypothetical consent" is obtained by presuming, in spite of or without regard to
her (possibly contrary) contemporaneously expressed preferences, that if she
truly understood the risks or were wholly free of voluntariness-reducing factors,
then she would consent because that would be the rational thing to do. 02 This
sort of consent is called "hypothetical rational consent,"'1 3  "objective
hypothetical consent,"' 4 or the "'real will' argument."'
0 5
Perhaps the most famous exposition of a hypothetical rational consent
argument for hard paternalism appears in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, where
Rawls argues that parties in the original position will not acknowledge "duties to
self.' 1 6 He writes:
make it fair to infer); idat 324. If so, then that is a case of individualized hypothetical consent. If,
on the other hand, the agent anticipates the subject's consent because the agent considers that is the
rational thing to do, then that is a case of hypothetical rational consent. See KULTGEN, supra note
4, at 222-23 (finding dispositional consent "problematic," an "untenable thesis of post facto
justification," and a theory that goes "down the road of implausibility"); Gewirth, supra note 100,
at 260 (observing that "the appeal to dispositional consent may be used in a paternalistic way to
justify acting on recipients without regard for their actual desires or beliefs or occurrent consent (or
dissent)").
101 See, e.g., DWORKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 100, at 88-89; BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A
RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS 249 n.18 (1997); KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 63-67; KULTGEN, supra note
4, at 139, 202; NiKKu, supra note 45, at 89-90; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 249 (1971);
VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 70-75; Richard J. Arneson, Mill Versus Paternalism, 90 ETHics 470,
474 (1980); Hodson, supra note 68, at 63; Marion Smiley, Paternalism and Democracy, 23 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 299, 304-06 (1989); Armsden, supra note 28, at 82, 119-20.
102 See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 414 ("[T]he justification of the position rests on the argument
that completely rational agents fuilly aware of their circumstances would 'consent to paternalism'
and would consent to a scheme of penalties that would deter them from any motive to undertake a
foolish action"); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 133 (1969)
("[T]hey would not resist me if they were as rational and as wise as I and understood their interests
as I do"); Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHics 301, 307 (1986) ("An advocate ...
might argue that we would surely agree with him, if only our heads were screwed on right");
Wennberg, supra note 56, at 17 ("Arguments based on hypothetical consent are widely used...
these arguments have become popular in legal theory as well").
103 Lewis, supra note 4, at 797.
l041d.
105 KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 58-59, 63-67.
106 RAWLS, supra note 101, at 248. Joel Feinberg notes that it is unclear if Rawls defends hard
paternalism or soft paternalism because it is unclear what sorts of encumbrances Rawls has in
mind. HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 185-86. I contend that the same ambiguity is true of many
other philosophers. Many who appear, at first sight, to be soft paternalists because they appeal to
some cognitive or volitional defect in the subject are, after all, not necessarily soft paternalists. Not
every appeal to a lack of voluntariness is automatically a soft paternalistic argument because not all
lacks of voluntariness make the subject's conduct non-substantially voluntary. See KLEINIG, supra
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It is also rational for them to protect themselves against their own irrational
inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give them a
sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain
impositions designed to undo the unfortunate consequences of their
imprudent behavior.
note 6, at 69; David Archard, For Our Own Good, 72 AUSTRALIAN J. PHIL. 283, 290 (1994);
Hodson, supra note 68, at 62. Many writers assume that all appeals to impairment, encumbrance,
or lack of voluntariness are necessarily arguments properly characterized as soft paternalism. This
is wrong. Surely, not everything short of full voluntariness is soft paternalism. This is why I follow
Faden and Beauchamp, and Beauchamp and Childress, in employing a threshold standard
"substantial voluntariness." Hard paternalists also appeal to epistemic and volitional defects in
making their justificatory case. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH,
MEDICAL ETHICS: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS 97 (1984) ("[T]he typical 'strong
paternalist' refer to factors that influence or fail to influence.... There is rarely a naked appeal to a
... paternalistic interest"); id. at 98 ("[T]he justifying reasons used by an alleged strong paternalist
may turn out to be similar in kind to those used by weak paternalists .... That is, the appeal may
in the end be to inordinately powerful psychological or situational factors.") This is true even for
what Beauchamp and McCollough call "cases of strong medical paternalism" in "pure form." See
also HETA HAYRY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND MEDICAL CONTROL 31 (1998); Beauchamp, Medical
Paternalism, supra note 28, at 139 ("[T]he strong paternalist ... will ultimately agree that the
fundamental consideration that makes legitimate apparently paternalistic interventions is the
substantially nonautonomy of a particular agent .... There will seldom if ever be a naked appeal to
a beneficent paternalistic interest, unqualified by considerations of limited capacity or
knowledge"); Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism and Refusals to Sterilize, in RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN MODERN MEDICINE: THE SECOND VOLUME IN A SERIES ON ETHICS, HUMANISM,
AND MEDICINE 137, 140 (Marc D. Basson ed. 1981) ("The grounds are that some agents capable of
autonomous decisions do not know their own best interests despite possessing adequate information
about their situation and despite being substantially voluntary") (emphasis added). So, we must
examine the defects more carefully and more precisely in order to determine which defects makes
an appeal soft paternalistic and which defects make an appeal hard paternalistic. Murphy appeals
to "incompetence"; Hodson appeals to "encumbrance"; H. L. A. Hart refers to "defects";
Thompson requires "impairment". Dennis F. Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and
Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 245, 250-51 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela
Bok eds. 1980). See also KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 226; Dan Brock, Paternalism and Promoting
the Good, in PATERNALISM 237, 244 (Rolf Sartorius ed. 1983). It is unclear whether these concepts
correlate precisely to soft paternalism. These concepts might be broader such that they cover both
soft paternalism and hard paternalism. Robert Young observes that some commentators have
construed Gerald Dworkin as defending hard paternalism. ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY:
BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSIvE LIBERTY 63, 69 (1986). Young, however, thinks that Dworkin is
defending only soft paternalism. Id. However, no such limit is explicit in Dworkin's writings.
Moreover, even if he purported to justify only soft paternalism (something for which there is no
evidence), that does not mean that his argument is thus limited. George Rainboldt is wrong to
assume that the "idea behind them all is the same" and that the existence of any of these factors
makes interference soft paternalism. Rainboldt, supra note 53, at 46. However, Rainboldt's
assumption is not surprising in light of the fact that, as he explains, his "discussion draws primarily
on Joel Feinberg's explication of the concept" of voluntariness. Id. at 46 n.6.
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Others are authorized and sometimes required to act on our behalf and to do
what we would do for ourselves if we were rational, this authorization
coming into effect only when we cannot look after our own good.1 °7
Notwithstanding its distinguished pedigree, the framing of hypothetical
rational consent as an enterprise of what a person would do if rational and
informed is misleading. 08 The argument relies not (as it purports to rely) upon
the supposition that the individual would consent but instead relies upon the
supposition that she should consent.
There is a strong normative judgment that persons ought to be rational and,
moreover, be rational in a certain way. 10 9 Gerald Dworkin, a leading exponent of
hypothetical rational consent, n ° admits that "there is always a danger of the
dispute over agreement and rationality being a disguised version of evaluative
and normative disagreement."' 1'1 Hypothetical rational consent masks a
disagreement about the dangerousness and/or value of the underlying conduct. 12
The notion of "rationality" is, after all, necessarily infused with subjective
values) 3 As Douglas MacLean explains:
107 RAWLS, supra note 101, at 249.
108 See KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 63 ("[A]ny pretense of actual consent is abandoned and replaced
by what is effectively a concern with rationally justifiable interferences"); Beauchamp,
Paternalism, supra note 66, at 1916 ("A justification based on consent may do more to obscure
than to clarify issues").
109 Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 119 (Richard A. Wasserstrom,
ed. 1971).
"0 See id. at 118-26; DwoRKiN, AUTONOMY, supra note 100, at 76-78, 124-29,
111 Dworkin, Paternalism, supra note 109, at 120; see also Gardner, supra note 94, at 69
("[H]ypothetical consent, as a justificatory device, is redundant"); Smiley, supra note 101, at 304-
06.
1 
2 See Smiley, supra note 101, at 315.
113 See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 203, 229 (1978) ("In
assuming such consent, all the biases afflicting the [agent's] perspective are in force"); CHILDRESS,
PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 97, at 137 ("[lIt may be unjustifiably paternalistic, or
imperialistic, to interpret a patient's story through a larger narrative pattern that blurs his or her
own identity and individuality") (emphasis added); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 5, at 50-51 ("In
general, the application of the harm principle requires some conception of normalcy.... [S]tatutes,
to be effective, must employ general terms without the endless qualification that would be needed
to accommodate the whole range of idiosyncratic vulnerabilities") (emphasis added); id at 112,
188 (positing a "standard person"); id. at 192, 216, 35; HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 184
("[Hypothetical rational consent] is the notion that we can ascribe to a person as his actual consent
what a hypothetical, perfectly rational person would consent to in his circumstances. The
assumption behind this attribution seems to be the claim, which we have repeatedly rejected, that
only rational (ideally reasonable) action is voluntary."); JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING:
THE MORAL LIMrTs OF THE CRimNAL LAW 142 (1988) (arguing that "limiting the jury of reasonable
persons to those who have the appropriate moral qualifications" would be a "flagrantly circular
procedure") (emphasis added); KLE[NIc, supra note 6, at 63 ("There is a tendency for the rational
individual to reflect the understanding and values of upholders of power or dominant ideology.
[The Argument from Hypothetical Rational Consent] is therefore prey to idiosyncrasy and partisan
constructions"); id. at 139-40 ("[M]ost judgments of mental illness have a strongly ideological
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In order to yield any answer at all to the question of what a rational person
would choose under ideal conditions, we must assume much more about that
person than formal conditions of rationality, such as consistency. These
further conditions will include assumptions about the values of a rational
person.
1 
14
Duncan Kennedy similarly explains:
There is no clear line between what the parties 'would have decided had they
adverted to this issue,' 'what reasonable people would have decided had they
adverted to this issue,' and 'what the parties should have decided had they
adverted to this issue.1
15
In short, through its reliance on rational consent, hypothetical rational consent
shrinks to the vanishing point any gap between "valid consent" and "wise
consent."
This shrinkage is illustrated in a recent medical battery case decided by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.1 6 In 2000, Eva Hoofnel "underwent a colonoscopy,
which revealed a lesion in her lower rectum." 1  Hoofnel's physician
recommended that in addition to colon surgery to remove the lesion, Hoofnel
character: they tell you more about the values of the person making the judgments than about the
condition of those in relation to whom the judgments are made"); KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 123
("[T]he consent of the imaginary rational person has nothing to do with the actual subject... [and]
adds nothing to the justification of an intervention in the actual person's life"); id. at 124 ("What
she thinks the rational judge would decide is precisely what she thinks is rational by her own
standards"); RAWLS, supra note 101, at 249 ("As we know less and less about a person, we act for
him as we would act for ourselves from the standpoint of the original position"); YOUNG, supra
note 106, at 67 ("Whether we acknowledge distortion or not tends to turn on what we value. This
may circularly lead us to apply our conception of the good for a person as a criterion for the proper
objects of rational and informed consent"); Douglas MacLean, Introduction to VALUES AT RISK 5
(Douglas MacLean ed. 1986) ("As the kind of consent becomes more indirect, the role of
rationality becomes correspondingly more important"); Brudney, supra note 61, at 260 ("[I]f a
decision is to be reached by reference to the moral force of the preferences of a certain class of
agents it seems important to explain why the preferences of that class are key"); Lewis, supra note
4, at 803 ("[I]f objective hypothetical consent is used to connote what abstract people in a state of
nature would consent to, then this choice is determined by the properties ascribed to these abstract
people") (emphasis added); Rainboldt, supra note 53, at 57 ("[W]e must define the character of the
fully rational agent.... Any definition of 'fully rational' would impose values on those who do not
fit the definition"); Thompson, supra note 106, at 263 ("To justify paternalism, we cannot appeal to
what rational persons in general would desire if we can determine what a particular person would
want in the circumstances") (emphasis added); Wennberg, supra note 56, at 29; Woodward, supra
note 28, at 74.
114 Douglas MacLean, Risk and Consent: Philosophical Issues for Centralized Decisions, in
VALUES AT RISK 17, 25 (Douglas MacLean ed. 1986).
115 Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 637
(1982).
16 Hoofnel, 2004 WL 911794.
"7 Id. at *1.
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should also undergo an appendectomy (to remove her appendix), an
oophorectomy (to remove her ovaries), and a hysterectomy (to remove her
uterus) because of the tendency of such organs to become cancerous." 8 Hoofnel
agreed to the colon surgery and appendectomy, but explained "that she did not
want her uterus or ovaries removed."' 9 Nevertheless, during surgery, Hoofnel's
physician "performed a hysterectomy and an oophorectomy."' 20 Hoofnel filed a
complaint alleging battery.121 But the trial court granted the physician's motions
for summary judgment. 12
The appellate court affirmed the trial court, holding that there was no issue
of material fact concerning whether Hoofnel had consented to the operations. 123
The appellate court explained that "no reasonable patient would have refused
consent to having her ovaries removed in consideration that such consent would
have been in her overwhelming best interest.""124 Cancer is a dreaded disease,
and Hoofnel was a 56-year-old post-menopausal woman to whom, the court
explained, her "uterus and ovaries were of no further utility." 125 Therefore, the
court concluded that "there was implied or presumed consent to the removal of
the ovaries."
'126
But, as the dissenting justice notes, "[w]hether or not the so-called
'reasonable person' in Hoofnel's position would have consented is not the
relevant inquiry."" 7  The relevant question is whether this patient in fact
consented to undergo the procedure. 2& Similarly, whether or not the procedure
was in Hoofnel's best interests is not the relevant inquiry. 129 Hoofnel's interests
were for her to determine. 
130
Like the dissenting justice in Hoofnel, Joel Feinberg calls hypothetical
consent a "a sham and an outrage" and a "dangerous counterfeit ... of consent
that cannot have the moral purchasing power of the real thing."' 31 He is right.
118 Id.
gld at *1.
120 Id. at *2. The lead physician testified that the condition of Mrs. Hoofinel's ovaries and uterus
did not present any type of emergency situation. See Motion for Discretionary Review at 4 (filed
May 11, 2004).
121 Hoofnel, 2004 WL 911794, at *2.
122 id.
231Id. at *1.
124/d. at *4.
12" Id. at *5.
1
26 Hoofnel, 2004 WL 911974, at *4.
1271d at *6.
121 Id. at *5.
121 Id. at *5-7.
130 See id.
131 HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 187, 181. See also Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the
Justified, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2201, 2305 (1992) ("Hypothetical consent lacks just the element that
makes an act of consent morally significant; namely, consent"); Perri 6, The Morality of Managing
Risk: Paternalism, Prevention and Precaution, and the Limits of Proceduralism, 3 J. RISK RES. 135,
144 (2000) ("[A]ppeals to likely subsequent consent or to hypothetical rational consent are
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Any theory that appeals to hypothetical consent to justify paternalistic actions
will justify far too much.' 32 Almost any risk accepted by a subject can form the
basis of an intervention on the grounds that no rational person would assume the
risk.'
33
C. Modified Hypothetical Consent
Recognizing the shortcomings of hypothetical rational consent, some
writers have devised variations and alternatives to the argument to address these
shortcomings. Even with these alternatives, the subject's consent is still
hypothetical. But although "reconstructed," the subject's consent is more
narrowly constrained. Rather than supposing that the subject would have
consented to the paternalistic intervention because that is what an ideal or
rational subject (as defined by the agent) would do, instead, on these alternative
theories, the agent determines the subject's consent by reference to the subject's
own well-established life plans.
Hypothetical individualized consent arguments have plausibility that
hypothetical rational consent arguments lack. Rather than imposing
"perfectionist notions of what is objectively good,"'134 individualized consent
unconvincing; other authors have, in my view and that of most commentators, conclusively
disposed of these arguments").
132 See ALAN BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS 36 (1989) ("A corrected
preference account of individual well-being is also subject to considerable abuse, particularly if
there is no adequate account of the sorts of corrections of preferences it should sanction"); HARM
TO SELF, supra note 4, at 184-86; JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 80
(1977) ("[T]his loophole cannot be stretched far without the autonomy principle collapsing into
utilitarianism"); TIM GRAY, FREEDOM 101 (1991); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 134-35
(1992) ("'Relatively weak... irrationality ... rationale for interference would open a far wider door
to paternalism than almost anyone should accept"); KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 59 (arguing that the
argument "opens the door to reconstructions that permit the overriding of any actual desire by a
fictional one with a quite different character"); SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF
LIBERALISM 69, 94 (1989); VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 74 ("[T]he concept of a 'fully rational
person' is too indeterminate . . . a logical construct"); id. at 70-75; Beauchamp, Medical
Paternalism, supra note 28, at 131 ("[T]he identification of the 'informed rational individual' is
often a mask.... The rationale for paternalistic policies is often nothing but the... rejection of an
alternative lifestyle or set of preferences") (emphasis added); Brudney, supra note 61, at 235;
Smiley, supra note 101, at 303-06; Woodward, supra note 28, at 75 ("Rational will arguments
abstract from the specific plans, values, and beliefs of agents [such that] the contrast I have
attempted to draw between consent-based and consequence-based justifications of paternalistic
treatment will collapse").
' See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 1, at 185; BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 132, at 56-57;
CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 85 ("Extended too far, the notion of consent becomes vacuous....
Appeals to a patient's rational will . . . are notoriously uncertain and even dangerous"); Gita S.
Cale, Continuing the Debate over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 131, 136
n.14 (1999); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Paternalism Really Never Justified: A Response to
Feinberg, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. No. 3 (forthcoming 2005) (discussing analogous confusion
and slippage concerning concepts such as competence).
134 Michael N. Goldman & Alvin I. Goldman, Paternalistic Laws, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 65, 71 (1990).
2005]
UMKC LAW RE VIEW
arguments, in contrast, "place stronger theoretical and practical constraints on
unwarranted paternalism by grounding individual well-being more squarely in
the underlying and enduring aims.., of the persons in question.'
135
Notwithstanding his well-known discussion of ideal rational agents, this
more individualized form of hypothetical consent may have been the sort of
consent that Rawls had in mind in Theory of Justice:136
Paternalistic decisions are to be guided by the individual's own settled
preferences and interests insofar as they are not irrational .... We must be
able to argue that with the development or recovery of his rational powers the
individual in question will accept our decision on his behalf and agree with us
that we did the best thing for him.
137
[P]aternalistic intervention must be... guided by the principles of justice and
what is known about the subject's more permanent aims and preferences ...
to guarantee the integrity of their person and their final ends and beliefs
whatever these are.'
38
But rather than unfruitfully engage in an exegesis of Rawls' work, I turn to
examine the more elaborate individualized consent argument of John Hodson.
135 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 132, at 36 (emphasis added). See also KULTGEN, supra note 4,
at 122; NIKKU, supra note 45, at 90-97, 110; Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for
Autonomy, 100 ETHics 318, 326 (1990) (arguing that Berlin "wrongly supposes that all talk about a
'rational will' or the 'hypothetical consent of a rational person' is a smokescreen for imposing
values on people that are quite alien to them"); Simmons, supra note 62, at 597 (hypothetical
consent can be ideal, counterfactual, or dispositional but only the last one is genuine); Wermberg,
supra note 56, at 24 (explaining HAl: "Actual Agent in Idealized Choice Situation"); Woodward,
supra note 28, at 72 (offering only one consent-based criterion for hard paternalistic treatment:
"that because of [the subject's] most deeply held projects and values he will consent to the
treatment in the future"); id. at 74 ("If we are to take seriously the idea of... choosing as the
subject herself would choose ... we must. . . hold the [subject's] actual plans, values, and desires
as nearly as intact as is consistent with imagining her to possess the capacity for rational consent
and choice and then ask how she would choose if she possessed such capacities") (emphasis
added).
136 See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 184 ("Rawls' discussion of paternalism, however, is sketchy
and does not give us clear warrant to attribute either the hypothetical rational theory of consent or
the 'reasonable will' theory to him"). Feinberg concludes that some of Rawls' other remarks
"suggest that Rawls is not prepared to go to the extreme of real-will theories." Id. at 186.
137 RAWLS, supra note 101, at 249 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
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1. John Hodson's Principle of Paternalism
John Hodson offers his "Principle of Paternalism" to determine when
paternalistic restriction is justified. 139 Hodson's principle requires:
1. Good evidence that the subject's decision is encumbered, and
2. Good evidence that the subject would be supportive of the
intervention.140
With regard to the first condition, Hodson is unclear whether
"encumbrance" pertains only to deficiencies that make a subject's conduct less
than substantially voluntary. 14  So, it is unclear whether Hodson meant for his
Principle of Paternalism to justify only soft paternalism or whether he meant it to
justify both soft paternalism and hard paternalism. 142  Nevertheless, we can
examine Hodson's Principle of Paternalism as a principle of justified hard
paternalism. So, I take Hodson's first condition to represent that although
"encumbered" to some degree, the subject still acts with substantial
voluntariness. 143
With regard to the second condition, Hodson argues that the agent must
have "good evidence" that the subject would (if she were not encumbered)
support the intervention. 44 In order to determine whether or not this condition is
satisfied, the agent should try to determine what would be the subject's
"hypothetical unencumbered decision" ("HUD").145 In other words, argues
Hodson, the agent should try to ascertain what the subject-though acting
139 See generally Hodson, supra note 68.
140 Hodson, supra note 68, at 65-67; JoHN D. HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL COERCION 46 (1983).
See also HAYRY, supra note 68, at 117-18.
141 See Hodson, supra note 68, at 65-57.
142 See id.
143 Cf Perri 6, supra note 131, at 144-45 ("The problem is finding a way to specify the context of
the actual subject's actual unimpaired capacities, in which the concept of being 'unimpaired' does
not lead the principle to collapse into the objectionable principle of hypothetically rational
consent"). Even above the threshold of substantial autonomy, there is still a wide range of degrees
to which conduct can be more or less autonomous. Even substantially autonomous choices may be
made out of: impetuousness; laziness; inertial habit; and other transitory impulses, encumbrances,
and deficiencies. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 115 (providing examples of temporarily
distorting circumstances that do not vitiate substantial voluntariness: fatigued, nervous, agitated,
excited); id. at 278 ("[H]is less-than-fully-voluntary consent will be 'voluntary enough' for a valid
and irrevocable contract"); KLEING, supra note 6, at 66, 85-86 (arguing that not all encumbrances
take the individual below the substantial autonomy threshold).
'4 Hodson, supra note 68, at 65.
141 Id. at 66.
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substantially voluntarily on the agent's stipulation-would decide were she free
of her cognitive and volitional defects.
1 46
In order to distinguish his Principle of Paternalism from the much-maligned
arguments for hypothetical rational consent, 147 Hodson carefully distinguishes a
"hypothetical unencumbered will" from a "rational will.' ' 148 Hodson rejects the
notion of a "rational will" because it is too abstract from the subject.'14  Using
such a notion, Hodson argues, is equivalent to hard paternalism because it is not
limited to the subject's epistemic or volitional encumbrances, but extends to
evaluative encumbrances as well. 150
The only legitimate use of the notion of a rational will, Hodson argues, is as
secondary evidence-though certainly not conclusive evidence-of the subject's
unencumbered empirical will. 5' That is, the subject's decision to encounter
serious harm is prima facie evidence of the existence of an encumbrance, and is
prima facie evidence that the subject's unencumbered empirical will or
hypothetical unencumbered decision would be otherwise. 152 The notion of the
"real will" is useful only as an adjunct to the more refined notion of the
"hypothetical unencumbered will."
The difference between a rational will and a hypothetical unencumbered
will lies in how broadly or narrowly the agent interprets the subject's defects. On
a rational will approach, the agent interprets the subject's defects broadly. For
example, the legislator, even upon learning of a motorcyclist's appreciation of
and deliberation over the risks of helmet-less riding, concludes that the cyclist
must be encumbered. Otherwise, the legislator reasons, the cyclist would not
choose to engage in such risky conduct for no good reason.
In contrast, on a hypothetical unencumbered will approach, the agent
construes the subject's defects narrowly, looking to what the subject's empirical
choice would be, if it were unencumbered. The HUD is focused on the subject
and is empirically verifiable in principle'5 3 In determining the justifiability of
hard paternalistic intervention on a hypothetical unencumbered will approach, the
agent takes the particular goals, beliefs, and values of the subject into account in
determining her HUD1' 54  Thus, for example, an agent could not justifiably
transfuse a Jehovah's Witness on the grounds that were she free from her
"misunderstanding" of the world, she would not oppose the transfusion. To
146 Though substantially voluntary, a subject's conduct will still have cognitive and volitional
defects. Human beings may never be able to act with "full voluntariness." But even when
substantially voluntary, conduct can be more or less voluntary to some degree.
147 See supra notes 101 to 133, and accompanying text.
148 Hodson, supra note 68, at 66-67.
149 Id. at 67.
150 Id.
'51 See id. at 68. See also Wennberg, supra note 56, at 29 n.9 ("[W]hat would have been rational
for parties ex ante does not entail what persons would have wanted to do, but it is the best evidence
of it") (citing Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 170 (1992)).
152 See idat 69; HODSON, supra note 128, at 46-48.
153 See Hodson, supra note 68, at 67.
154 See HODSON, supra note 140, at 51.
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characterize the subject's religious beliefs as a "misunderstanding," or as an
epistemic defect, would ignore the subject's values and beliefs.' 55
In sum, on a modified hypothetical consent approach, the subject's
hypothetical consent is not determined by reference to a rational person. Instead,
the subject's hypothetical consent is determined by reference to the actual facts
and values of the particular real-life subject with whose liberty intervention is
contemplated. The inquiry is "empirically focused" on this subject.5 6 This is,
Hodson argues, the alleged primary virtue of the modified hypothetical consent
argument.' 57 The "empirical focus" arguably lessens the imposition of alien
values typical of (if not intrinsic to) hypothetical rational consent.
58
2. Analysis of Modified Hypothetical Consent
The individualized forms of hypothetical consent are a significant
improvement over the rational hypothetical consent arguments. They avoid
many of the problems attributed to those much-maligned arguments.
Nevertheless, modified hypothetical consent arguments are still vulnerable to
several objections. Most notably, they still leave the paternalistic agent with too
much discretion.
Marion Smiley agrees that hypothetical individualized consent arguments
are superior to rational will arguments because, at least, they take the subject's
own ends into consideration. Smiley argues, however, that hypothetical
individualized consent arguments are, nevertheless, not workable as a
justification for legal paternalism. 60 This is because in legal paternalism, unlike
physician paternalism, the agent (the state) has no particular knowledge of
subjects. Without such information, the state must, out of practical necessity,
revert to use of the rational will argument.
Smiley's objection might be too strong. The state agent may be able to
employ a standard of "normalcy" to guide its judgments as to what would and
what would not be a serious intrusion for particular groups of individuals.
161
155 Cf Wennberg, supra note 56, at 26-27 ("The question is not what one would choose if she had
beliefs that she lacks in reality, but what she would choose if her epistemic decision base were in
some respect different."). Like John Hodson, Donald Van De Veer also offers an alternative to
hypothetical rational consent. Van De Veer names his argument, which is similar to Hodson's
hypothetical unencumbered will argument, the "Principle of Hypothetical Individualized Consent."
See VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 75-81. See also Perri 6, supra note 131, at 144 (adapting PHIC
to the "extended consent principle" and dropping condition 2b).
156 Cf Woodward, supra note 28, at 83 n.30.
157 See generally Hodson, supra note 68.
158 See VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 392. See also KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 59 (making a similar
argument in terms of "integrity"); VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 234, 336, 398-414 (making a
similar analysis of paternalism toward prior competents); Woodward, supra note 28, at 75-81.
159 See Smiley, supra note 101, at 306.
160 See id. at 306.
161 See RuTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A THEORY AND HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 343, 361
(1986) (arguing that in policy contexts the state can use an objective standard based on the
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Such a normalcy standard could be determined through sociological and
anthropological research, and would permit the agent to justify intervention on
the ground that-according to the (statistically supported) normalcy standard-
the subject will probably be supportive. 162  Such a standard could be used to
constrain the agent from imposing its own values.
Nevertheless, Smiley's objection certainly has force. Although the agent
does not have the virtually carte blanche authority of hypothetical rational
consent, the agent still has enormous discretion to discern and interpret the
subject's values. For example, the agent can interpret the subject's values at
varying levels of generality or specificity. The agent can interpret just how the
subject's values apply to particular circumstances. And the agent can interpret
how the subject's values are balanced against each other. 63  Modified
reasonable, ordinary or average person) (emphasis added); id. at 260 (suggesting the plausibility of
objectivity tied to average persons) (emphasis added); id. at 46 n.28 (explaining the objective
standard of reasonable person as "common behavioral assumptions" that are "prescriptive as well as
descriptive"); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 5, at 50-51 ("In general, the application of the harm
principle requires some conception of normalcy. . . . [S]tatutes, to be effective, must employ
general terms without the endless qualifications and refinements that would be needed to
accommodate the whole range of idiosyncratic vulnerabilities") (emphasis added); id. at 112, 188
(positing a "standard person"); id. at 35, 192, 216; OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 5, at 33-34;
HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 128; id. at 181 (using "actuarial tables"); id. at 203, 228, 258; id.
at 210 (law uses objective standards); id. at 219-28 (norms of expectability); OFFENSE TO OTHERS,
supra note 5, at 258 ("In human legislatures and courts of law ... for practical reasons they are
forced to formulate rules based on the presumptive preferences of standard persons, thus
discouraging subsequent judicial inquiry into actual preferences of real individuals") (emphasis
added); id. at 259-60; id. at 274-75 ("[T]he law must create order and predictability by using some
notion of a 'standard individual'.... [P]ublic rules take both the arbitrariness and the vulnerability
out of voluntary transactions") (emphasis added); id. at 290 (determining intent); id. at 300
(making presumptions when conduct "exceedingly rare"); OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 5, at 324
(providing examples where one would want to be pushed out of the way of a bus-"indirect
statistical evidence, when overwhelming" or even best interest standard when no subjective
evidence); HODSON, supra note 128, at 50 ("relevance of judgments as to what most competent
persons would decide to do in similar circumstances"); HUSAK, supra note 28, at 132 ("[T]he law,
necessarily expressed in general terms, should be responsive to the most common, typical reason
why persons assume risks") (emphasis added); KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 161; NIKKU, supra note
45, at 97-102, 244, 261 (offering hypothetical consent of the majority); Smiley, supra note 101, at
305-08; C.L. Ten, Paternalism and Morality, 13 RATIO 56, 57 (1971) ("What is regarded as
harmful depends on the common values of the community and the ideal patterns of life cherished by
it") (emphasis added); VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 107 ("Legislatures, of course, typically
promulgate laws for entire classes of persons"); id. at 359; Daniel Wikler, Coercive Measures in
Health Promotion: Can They Be Justified? 6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 223, 229-30 (1978);
Matjaz Zwitter et al., Professional and Public Attitudes Towards Unsolicited Medical Intervention,
318 BMJ 251, 251-53 (1999) (providing statistics for normalcy inferences).
162 This position has been recently defended in WILLIAM J. TALBOTr, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN
WELL-BEING (forthcoming 2005).
163 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING ThE CONSTITUTION 73-80
(1991) (discussing the problem of characterization of constitutionally protected rights: "At what
level of generality ... should the right be described?"). Of course, the agent has discretion in just
how he individuates and describes not only the subject's preferences but also the subject's conduct.
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hypothetical consent is surely a move in the right direction. But it needs a great
deal of specification to become a convincing theory of justified hard
paternalism.
164
V. FOCUSING ON CONSENT MISFRAMES THE ISSUE
Consent-based arguments for the justifiability of hard paternalism are torn
between incoherence and a lack of moral force. The few forms of consent-based
arguments (i.e. prior consent and hypothetical individualized consent) that
successfully resolve this tension have a limited applicability and usefulness
because of their narrow justificatory scope. But there is a more fundamental
problem with consent-based arguments. Even if they do not fail on their own
terms, consent is, nevertheless, an inferior framework for examining the
justifiability of hard paternalism. Consent-based arguments do not capture and
incorporate the tradeoffs that are being made.
The fundamental and most serious objection to consent-based arguments is
that they rely on an appeal to beneficence. 65 Isaiah Berlin called consent-based
arguments a "monstrous impersonation," explaining:
See HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 123, 129, 132, 277, 282, 294, 304-05; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP,
supra note 161, at 244 n. 13; VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 6, 30; CARL GINET, ON ACTION 45-71
(1990) (discussing key literature on individuation); Gordon, supra note 94, at 268 ("[A]n action can
be referred to by different descriptions"); Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on "Voluntary" Versus
"Involuntary" Risks, 8 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 173, 179 (1997); Albert Weale, Invisible Hand
or Fatherly Hand? Problems of Paternalism in the New Perspective on Health, 7 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 784, 788 (1983) ("[T]here is a certain indefiniteness about the identification of
actions").
164 Cf Linda J. Emanuel, Advance Directives: Do They Work? 25 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 35, 36
(1995) (noting the inability of spouses to predict the other's wishes). Cf M.L. Gross, Treating
Competent Patients by Force: The Limits of Israel's Patients Rights Act, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 29, 32
(2005) ("A patient may also change his values. He may become convinced that living without a leg
or hooked up to a ventilator is no so bad after all. But then again he may not, and the health care
professional has no way of knowing this in advance, nor are there sufficient grounds to make an
educated guess.").
165 See BERLIN, supra note 102, at 133-34; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 161, at 9 ("If
restriction is in order, the justification will rest on some competing moral principle"); PRINCIPLES,
supra note 1, at 281; KLEING, supra note 6, at 62; VAN DE VEER, supra note 5, at 83, 154
(discussing Husak's consequentialist alternative to PHIC and observing that "[olnce the notion of
consent is omitted from the criteria . . . it becomes evident that the central focus is on the
reasonableness of the interference") (emphasis added); Bayles, supra note 100, at 111; Beauchamp,
Paternalism, supra note 66, at 1916; Dan Brock, A Case for Limited Paternalism, 4 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, 79, 82-83 (1985); Dan W. Brock, Paternalism and Autonomy, 98 ETHICS 550, 556-65
(1988); id. at 13, 16-19; Peter Hobson, Another Look at Paternalism, 1 J. APPLIED PHIL. 301, 301
(1984) ("[I]f judgments about consent are to have any legitimacy, they will in practice be based on
considerations to do with the nature of the subject and the sort of harm involved"); Woodward,
supra note 28, at 75-76 (noting that it collapses into consequentialism); Zamir, supra note 28, at
241; Armsden, supra note 28, at 125.
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It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does
not; and even to ignore his wishes for its-and his-sake; and a very
different one to say that he has eo ipso chosen it, not indeed consciously, not
as he seems in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his
empirical self may not know-the 'real' self which discerns the good, and
cannot help choosing it once it is revealed. l 6
It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good which I am too
blind to see .... It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being
coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not."
167
More recently, Douglas Husak argued that: "The notion of consent is
retained in the criteria to create the impression that a concern for moral autonomy
is preserved. In reality, however, consent plays only a token role in the criteria..
[ . T]he central focus is on the reasonableness of the interference." 168 Nina
Nikku similarly explains that the consequentialist way is more appropriate,
"more positive towards paternalistic actions whereas the ways of justification
where the individual's right to self-determination is stressed entail more severe
demands on the justification of a paternalistic action."
69
Of course, rather than offering conditions under which paternalism is
reasonable, one could specify considerations for assessing the probability of
obtaining the subject's consent-and make that the test for the justifiability of
hard paternalism. But that would obscure the justificatory appeals and value
trade-offs that are being made. 71 After all, the primary basis for assessing that
the subject would probably consent is the agent's judgment that the interference
is reasonable for the subject.' 72 Therefore, it is this (reasonableness) judgment
that is the relevant target of normative inquiry.
73
166 BERLIN, supra note 102, at 133-34.
167 Id. at 134.
168 Husak, supra note 28, at 34-35 (emphasis added). See also Woodward, supra note 28, at 75
("Rational will arguments abstract from the specific plans, values, and beliefs of agents [such that]
the contrast I have attempted to draw between consent-based and consequence-based justifications
of paternalistic treatment will collapse").
169 NIKKu, supra note 45, at 266.
170 See Carter, supra note 4, at 139. Cf Robert E. Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of
the Nanny State, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 42, 43 (1991) ("Rights theorists and paternalists would
still be at odds, but less so, if paternalists refrained from talking about interests in so starkly
objective a way").
'7' Nevertheless, consent-based arguments are not worthless. John Kultgen argues that even if
consent arguments carry insufficient force to justify paternalistic interventions, they still have
epistemic or "epistemological value." KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 121, 124, 139, 235. They can still
provide evidence of an individual's conception of the good. That is, they are useful heuristically-
in determining, as an evidentiary matter, what, in fact, will best promote a subject's good. Cf
CHILDRESS, supra note 18, at 96; HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 187, 290; Kasachkoff, supra note
3, at 11. Cf supra notes 151 to 152, and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 101 and 133; see also JUDITH JARvIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 188 n.5
(1990) ("How do we know they would consent .... Well, living by those rules is to their
advantage-their real advantage, as opposed to what they might in the circumstances (and given
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It is better to recognize and to explicitly incorporate the operative normative
appeals. 174 James Childress contends "It is more defensible to face directly the
their wants) think to be to their advantage. But then that is what does the moral work of justifying
the thesis that those rules are just."); Wennberg, supra note 56, at 27 ("There is absolutely nothing
in the concept of consent that is not already contained in a statement about one's preferences.... It
seems to be exactly the same thing to say that something is justified because it increases one's
welfare and to say that it is justified because one would give a consent to it."); id. at 32 (arguing
that consent-based arguments "can be presented in welfarist terms, and the whole of idea of
hypothetical consent becomes pointless").
'73See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 281; id. at 271-84 ("Beneficence alone truly justifies
paternalistic actions"); BEAUCHAMP & MCCULLOUGH, supra note 106, at 98-99, 102; CHILDRESS,
PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 97, at 60; DWORKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 100, at 32, 114;
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 161, at 10; HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 75-79, 87; GERT,
supra note 101, at 225-28 (rejecting the "strict deontological position"); GLOVER, supra note 132, at
75; HUSAK, supra note 28, at 89; KLEINIG, supra note 6, at 5; KULTGEN, supra note 4, at 38, 103,
111, 114; Richard J. Arneson, Paternalism, Utility, and Fairness, 43 REV. INT'L PHIL. 409, 436,
n.27 (1989); Brock, supra note 106, at 552; Dworkin, Paternalism, supra note 109, at 116; Willard
Gaylin, Worshipping Autonomy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov./Dec. 1996, at 43, 45 ("The imperialism
and arrogance of autonomy must be bridled. A work of recovery and remembering other
dimensions of freedom is needed. This will give us better conceptual tools for principled political
argument, social consensus, and moral common sense."); Hobson, supra note 165, 299-300 (1984);
id. at 301 (arguing that there are "two central features relevant to justifying paternalism" One must
consider not just the subject but also "the beneficial consequences to be brought about."); Ian Hunt,
Risking One's Life: "'Soft Paternalism" and Feinberg 's Account of Legal Liberalism, 8 CAN. J. L.
& JuRis. 311, 311-12 (1995); Kasachkoff, supra note 3, at 413; Bill New, Paternalism and Public
Policy, 15 J. ECON. & PHIL. 63, 82 (1999) ("Inflexible and absolutist theoretical dogma is unhelpful
in the real world"); Steven Lee, On the Justification of Paternalism, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 193,
200 (1981) ("[T]here must be a genuine weighing."). Cf Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the
Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 183 (1999); at 185 ("Those hidden normative
dimensions are what do the work in the harm principle, not the abstract, simple notion of harm");
id. at 193 ("[T]he collapse of the harm principle... may force us to address the other normative
dimensions lurking beneath the conception of harm").
174 See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 250
(1996) (arguing that rather than making a "strained" argument to find some other-regarding harm,
that "[t]he more straightforward response is to concede that some moralist [or paternalist] claims
may count, and to try to develop criteria for separating those that should count from those that
should not"); RUTH MACKLIN, ENEMIES OF PATIENTS 184 (1993) ("It is important not to misuse the
language of futility to mask quality-of-life judgments. Honesty demands that the issue of quality of
life be confronted squarely.") (emphasis added); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70-86 (David
Spitz ed., w.w. Norton & Co. 1975) ("If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper
care of themselves, I would rather it for their own sake than under pretence of preventing them
from impairing their capacity or imparting society benefits") (emphasis added); G. EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 228-29 (1985) (noting the benefits of isolating
elements of tort law: making more precise judgments and making them more transparent); Alan M.
Dershowitz, Mill on Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM BY JOHN STUART MILL vii, xi
(1993) (arguing against Lawrence Tribe: "I, too, favor mandatory seat belt laws, but I recognize
that support for such paternalistic legislation requires a compromise with Mill's principle. And it is
a compromise I am prepared to make explicitly rather than uncomfortably try to squeeze seat belt
laws into Mill's principle by invoking flying people and convoluted logic.") (emphasis added);
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century: Part IT. Public Health Regulation: A
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conflict between [autonomy] and other principles rather than reinterpret
[autonomy] by extending it to circumstances where it does not apply. Then we
can determine more clearly whether [autonomy] can be outweighed by
competing principles in the circumstances."' 
75
Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress write: "Although writers in biomedical
ethics often resort to fictions such as deemed consent, it is more defensible to
argue straighforwardly that a patient's autonomy, liberty, privacy, or
confidentiality can be justifiably overridden."' 176 A consent model obscures the
operative normative appeals.' A balancing model, on the other hand,
recognizes the operative normative appeals as relevant and incorporates them
explicitly.
178
Furthermore, conceptual clarity and linguistic honesty are not the only
benefits of moving from a consent-based model to a beneficence-based balancing
model. Because of the vagueness and imprecision required to fit "round"
normative judgments into "square" conceptual holes, consent-based arguments
provide a breeding ground for bias and prejudice. 179 A balancing model, on the
Systematic Evaluation, 283 JAMA 3118, 3119 (2000) (criticizing "strained conception[s] of social
harms" and recommending "recognizing certain public health interventions as justified
paternalism"); Robert N. Harris, Jr., Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm
to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REv. 581, 592 (1967) ("The test for consent
should not mask circularity of reasoning or irrationality. If Y is capable of contracting, he should
be able to consent. If there is a good reason that consent should be negatived in the X-Y situation,
that reason needs articulation and justification."); Rainboldt, supra note 53, at 56
("Acknowledging that paternalism is sometimes permissible would allow us to give the most
obvious and natural explanation of these laws"); Edward Sankowski, "Paternalism" and Social
Policy, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 10 (1985); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The
Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 26 (199 1).
175 CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 97, at 67 (emphasis added). Joel Feinberg
writes, "[tjhe more overtly paternalistic language seems much less contrived and more honest."
HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 85. "It much better serves the cause of moral clarity to call a spade
a spade." Id. at 87. See also Richard Reeves, Even in a Truly Liberal Society, Paternalism Must
Sometimes Prevail, NEW STATESMAN, Dec. 24, 2004, at 46, 48 ("Better honest paternalism than
false liberalism .... The problem is that the argument is not taking place, so that a muddled or
deliberately obfuscating government often ends up dressing a paternalistic policy in tatty liberal
clothes.").
176 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 130.
177 See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 1, at 185 ("[A]ppeals to consent obscure more than they
clarify the issues. It is best to keep autonomy-based justifications at arm's length from
paternalism").
178 The first criterion for sound theory is simplicity, also often referred to as economy or elegance.
See generally BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 1, at 338-39; P. FRANK, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:
T4E LINK BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 350-51 (1957); Bunge, The Weight of Simplicity in
the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories, 28 PHIL. SCI. 120, 125-26 (1961); Nancy
Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L.
REv. 263, 268 (1989). The least complicated theory of explanation is preferred. The consent-based
theory for hard paternalism fails to satisfy this criterion.
179 Cf Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the undue
burden standard for determining the constitutionality of abortion laws as unprincipled "policy-
judgment-couched-as-law"); Pope, supra note 133 (reviewing the use of other vague concepts to
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other hand, does not require the distortions that the consent-based theory
requires. A balancing model, therefore, hinders, rather than facilitates, the
masking of illegitimate value judgments under purported neutral concepts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consent-based arguments for the justifiability of hard paternalism lack
legitimacy and plausibility. And, as if this were not bad enough, consent-based
arguments also misframe the normative inquiry. To avoid distortion and
dishonesty, consent-based justifications, except perhaps for certain types of prior
consent arguments, should be set aside. Policymakers and academics should
instead employ beneficence-based arguments, and focus on articulating
consequentialist arguments for why, in cases of intuitively reasonable and
appropriate hard paternalistic liberty limitation, the benefits secured for the
subject outweigh the subject's autonomy interests.
shield discriminatory and ill-founded regulation: "disease," "death," "futility," "competence," and
"naturalness").
2005]

